


The Tito—Stalin Split  
70 years after  
International Conference  
Zagreb — Goli otok  
28/30 June 2018



Tito — — Stalin Split

**International Conference**  
The Tito-Stalin Split 70 Years After

**Izdavač:**

Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu  
FF press



**Za izdavača:**

prof. dr. sc. Vesna Vlahović-Štetić

**Urednici:**

Tvrtko Jakovina  
Martin Previšić  
Dea Marić

**Grafičko oblikovanje naslovnice:**

Ena Begčević  
Mikela Cvitanović

**Računalni slog:**

Marko Maraković

**Naklada:**

100 primjeraka

**Tisak:**

Kolor klinika d.o.o., Zagreb



*University of Ljubljana*



University of Zagreb Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences –  
Department of History  
University of Ljubljana Faculty of Arts – Department of History

# **International Conference**

## The Tito-Stalin Split 70 Years After

Zagreb and Goli otok  
28-30 June 2018

 **FF press**

## **Organizing Committee:**

**PhD Bojan Balkovec**

Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

**PhD Stefano Bianchini**

University of Bologna

**PhD Tvrтко Jakovina**

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb

**PhD Martin Previšić**

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb

**PhD Božo Repe**

Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

## **Foreword**

The announcement of the Information Bureau Resolution of 28 June 1948 initiated the break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which would quickly turn into one of the most important events of the early phase of the Cold War. It was the first major conflict in the theretofore-monolithic international communist movement and it remained a permanent reference for communist parties that wanted to become ideologically and politically emancipated from Moscow. For socialist Yugoslavia, it remained the most important, defining, event of its history. One of the outcomes of the break in this aspect was the specific development of Yugoslavia, which remained communist, but was able to articulate its own path both in the internal and foreign policy stage. This led to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, an organization bringing together states independent of the Western or the Eastern Bloc. This is the main reason why Yugoslavia and its leader Josip Broz Tito became an important factor in Cold War international relations. The Break of 1948 also initiated a series of processes in the internal Yugoslav ideological, economic and social spheres. During the conflict (1948-1956) Yugoslav secret police (UDBA), motivated by fear of an internal coup and an outside military intervention, carried out a wave of arrests of real and alleged Stalin supporters („ibeovci“) who mostly ended up in camps (Goliotok, Sveti Grgur) and prisons where they were exposed to physical and psychological abuse and severe physical labor. In addition, the separation from Moscow initiated reforms of the system, organization of the state and Party, primarily focusing on limited political, economic and administrative decentralization and liberalization. The efforts to become emancipated from Soviet and homegrown Stalinism spurred various processes in social, cultural, artistic and other forms of Yugoslav life.

The aim of the conference is to bring together scientists whose ideas and work contribute to new interpretations of the different aspects of the Tito-Stalin conflict.



# DAY 1

Krležin Gvozd, Zagreb  
June 28<sup>th</sup> 2018

**21:00** Conference opening

Tvrko Jakovina  
Božo Repe

The opening event will include archival material screening (excerpts from Walter Neugebauer's *Big meeting* animated movie and various historical magazines) selected and edited by Tvrko Jakovina and by courtesy of the *Croatian State Archives*. Screening will be followed by a literature reading piece (various pieces of Miroslav Krleža and Secret Speech of Nikita Khrushchev) performed by Luka Dragić.

# DAY 2

June 29<sup>th</sup>,  
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb

**9.00-9.10:** Opening remarks

## **First session**

**9.10-9.25: Mark Kramer** (Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University), *Stalin and the Soviet-Yugoslav Split*



**9.25-9.40: Peter Ruggenthaler** (University of Graz), *The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin's Foreign Policy, 1945-53*

**9.40-9.55: Petar Dragišić** (Institute of Contemporary History of Serbia), *Walking a Tightrope: Tito's Regional Ambitions and the Cominform Resolution*

**9.55-10.10: Ivo Goldstein** (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb), *The Tito-Stalin Split 1948 as a Personal Conflict*

**10.10-10.35:** Discussion

## Second session

**10.35-10.50: Božo Repe** (Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana), *How Slovenia Became the Westernmost Part of the Eastern World at the Time of the Cominform*

**10.50-11.05: Stefano Bianchini** (University of Bologna), *The Tito-Stalin Split, the Italian Left and the Fascination of the anti-Stalinist Communism*

**11.05-11.20: Janine-Marie Calic** (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München), *Tito, the Policy of Active Coexistence and the German Question (1968-1975)*

**11.20-11.35: Andrey Edemskiy** (Slavic Studies Institute/Russian Academy of Sciences), *Soviet Information Policy During Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and Normalization: Between Propaganda and Objective Briefing (1948-1958)*

**11.35-12.00:** Discussion

**12.05-12.20:** Coffee break

### Third session

**12.20-12.35: Christian Axboe Nielsen** (Aarhus University), *The Office of State Security (SDS) and Surveillance of Cominform Supporters After Goli Otok*

**12.35-12.50: Bojan Balkovec** (Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana), *Party Cells Support Measures Against Hebrang and Žujović*

**12.50-13.05: Aleš Gabrič** (Institute of Contemporary History, Ljubljana), *Cominform Supporters in Slovenia*

**13.05-13.20: Darja Kerec** (Faculty of Education, University of Ljubljana), *The Role of Russia and the Soviet Union in the History of Prekmurje*

**13.20-13.45:** Discussion

**13.45-15.00:** Lunch break

### Fourth session

**15.00-15.15: Boris Stamenić**, *Humour, Mockery And Visual Representation in the Context of the Tito-Stalin Split*

**15.15-15.30: Dragomir Bondžić** (Institute of Contemporary History, Belgrade), *Repercussions of the Tito-Stalin Split 1948 on Belgrade University*

**15.30-15.45: Klaus Buchenau** (University of Regensburg), *Brotherhood in Crisis: The Orthodox Serb-Russian Network Before, During and After the Tito-Stalin Split*

**15.45-16.10:** Discussion

## Fifth session

**16.10-16.25: John P. Kraljic** (Croatian Academy of America), *Yugoslav-American Communities and the Tito-Stalin Break*

**16.25-16.40: Ondřej Vojtěchovský** (Charles University, Prague), *Narratives on the Titoist Repressions in the Circles of Yugoslav Cominformist Exile (in Czechoslovakia)*

**16.40-16.55: David Tompkins** (Carleton College, USA), *Imagining Yugoslavia in Warsaw and East Berlin in the Early Cold War: The Tito-Stalin Split and Its Effects on Polish and East German Society*

**16.55-17.10: Péter Vukman** (University of Szeged), *The History of Yugoslav Cominformist Emigrants in Hungary (1948–1953)*

**17.10-17.40: Maximilian Graf** (European University Institute – History and Civilization, Florence), *Upside-Down: Bilateral and Transnational Relations Between Austria and Yugoslavia Before and After 1948*

*and*

**Karlo Ružičić-Kessler** (Free University of Bozen-Bolzano), *The Tito-Stalin Split and its Effects on Communist Party Relations: A Case Study*

**17.40-18.10: Discussion**

## Sixth session

**18.10-18.25: Tvrtko Jakovina** (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb), *Against the Betrayal of Tito's Gang. Tour of Hajduk Soccer Team in Australia and their Fight against the Cominform Supporters in 1949*

**18.25-18.40: Martin Previšić** (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb), *The 1948 Split and the New Round of Factional Battles within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia: Parallel Biographies and Histories*

**Conference closing**

## DAY 3

**June 30th, Goli otok**

Visit to Goli otok & Guided tour

## BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

*Christian Axboe Nielsen*

Aarhus University

### **THE OFFICE OF STATE SECURITY (SDS) AND SURVEILLANCE OF COMINFORM SUPPORTERS AFTER GOLI OTOK**

The paper will explore the issue of surveillance of Cominform supporters after they had returned from Goli otok. It will look at this issue up to the mid-1980s and will specifically deal with the problem of fear within the State Security Service of a Soviet-led attack against Yugoslavia after Tito's death.

*Bojan Balkovec*

Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

### **PARTY CELLS SUPPORT MEASURES AGAINST HEBRANG AND ŽUJOVIĆ**

The Archives of the Republic of Slovenia house material from the League of Communists of Slovenia (LCS). Preserved among this material are a few materials connected with the Cominform. Various letters sent by bodies of the then Communist Party of Slovenia (CPS) to the Central Committee regarding the situation in the field have been preserved. Among the more voluminous complete correspondence is a ring binder that contains letters sent by various party cells to the Central Committee in Belgrade. Despite the Belgrade addressee, this material is kept in the CPS/LCS archive in Ljubljana. The aforementioned ring binder contains a great number of letters in which the party cells in Slovenia supported the decision of the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) on measures against Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Žujović. This paper will focus on an analysis of these statements. They were usually written on a single sheet of paper and were either typewritten or handwritten. The interesting manuscripts

are those containing the clumsy handwriting of a less educated individual who did not write much, or, on the other hand, the artistic manuscripts in which the form was used to highlight the importance of the text. From a technical perspective, the paper on which the statement was written is also interesting. Some statements were stamped, but many were not. Most of the statements are dated May 1948, while some are from June of that year. A content analysis will attempt to find the typical contents of these texts and look for nuances of expression. We must not overlook the various assurances given by organisations. Thus we can read their oaths to fight to preserve the revolution and the diverse goals of the building of socialism. Last but not least, the greeting is also telling: in pretty much all of the letters it reads “Death to Fascism, Freedom to the People”. The statements also contain a signature – most often that of the secretary of the party cell. There are also cases where the statement was signed by all members of the cell, which could mean over 10 signatures. I will also attempt to geolocate these statements by party cells.

***Stefano Bianchini***

University of Bologna

### **THE TITO-STALIN SPLIT, THE ITALIAN LEFT AND THE FASCINATION OF THE ANTI-STALINIST COMMUNISM**

The contribution will focus on the impact of the Tito-Stalin split on the Italian Left. As is known, the reactions were diversified. On the one hand there was the position of the Italian Communist and Socialist Parties who supported Stalin mostly through media, although minor groups tried to support in Istria a secret movement of “resistance” against Tito. But more surprising for the time being was the process that started some years later, in 1951, when a closest collaborator of Togliatti, Valdo Magnani, took a public political position in support of communist autonomy from Moscow. Excluded from his party, he established a new anti-Stalinist movement, close to Tito, that divided the Italian Left and encouraged Yugoslavia to dream that a communist anti-Stalinist movement could rise in Western Europe.

Although this hope vanished soon, the event had a great psychological impact on the Yugoslav leadership.

*Dragomir Bondžić*

Institute of Contemporary History, Belgrade

### **REPERCUSSIONS OF THE TITO-STALIN SPLIT 1948 ON BELGRADE UNIVERSITY**

The presentation deals with repercussions of the Tito-Stalin Split 1948 on Belgrade University. The Resolution of Cominform and the conflict between Yugoslavia and Soviet Union in 1948 led to a strong shock in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and major changes in Yugoslav state and society. The consequences of the conflict have also been strongly reflected on Belgrade University. The Belgrade University was one of the three biggest and the most important high educational institutions in country, with crucial importance for state policy of formation of high educated staff and “new socialist intelligentsia”. That’s why the University was pervaded with Party organs that controlled life, work, ideological and political attitudes of students and teaching staff. Repercussions of the Tito-Stalin Split were expressed through more active political control over University, with participation of Secret police, and removal of the Cominform supporters from the Party and from the University. The first Cominform supporters among teaching staff and students were detected and punished by the end of summer 1948. In the end of 1940s and early 1950s, the persecution of the Cominform supporters on University continued. Some of them were arrested and taken to a camp at Goli Otok. All the time there was a constant ideological-political and propaganda pressure on teaching staff and students, conducted by Party organs, glorifying the policy of the Yugoslav leadership and attacking the Soviet Union and other countries of Cominform. Finally, repercussions of the conflict affected teaching process through the contents of the curricula and syllabuses, lectures, textbooks, teaching of the foreign languages, in international cooperation, orientation of scholarship policy, and student’s daily life. The presentation is based on archival sources, published sources and literature.

***Klaus Buchenau***

University of Regensburg

**BROTHERHOOD IN CRISIS: THE ORTHODOX SERB-RUSSIAN NETWORK BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE TITO-STALIN SPLIT**

The beginnings of Serb-Russian solidarity can be traced back into the Middle Ages. In the 20th century, it developed into the idea that both Serbs and Russian were not only Christian Orthodox and Slavic, but also shared a historical destiny (such as paying high blood tolls for one's heroism against foreign invaders or being the only nations willing to keep together their respective multiethnic states). At the end of the Second World War, Stalin (but also Tito) made use of this tradition when they propagated Yugoslavia's geopolitical shift into the Soviet sphere of influence. By striking pan-Slavic tunes, they tried to gain the support of Serbs and Montenegrins who were not communists but inclined to see the Soviet Union as a continuation of Orthodox, pre-revolutionary Russia, which was perceived as an eternal friend. The year 1948 changed this constellation considerably: Orthodox Serbs began to understand that opting for Tito meant being against Russia. Alienation between the Yugoslav Communists and the Serbian Orthodox Church sharpened, and contacts between the patriarchies of Moscow and Belgrade were blocked for months. White Russian émigrés, who had upheld a notion of Serb-Russian friendship in the traditional sense during the inter-war period, were forced to make a choice. Many had fled the arrival of the Red Army in 1944; for those who decided to stay in Yugoslavia, some paid with their lives during the repressions of 1948 and after. Others decided to „return“ to the Soviet Union. During and after the Tito-Stalin split, their intimate knowledge was used to help Moscow craft anti-Yugoslav propaganda. When the first Soviet journalists were allowed to re-enter Yugoslavia in the late 1950s, they were eager to re-create the friendship myth - by depicting the Yugoslav elite as decadent and alienated, but the simple folk as egalitarian, warm-hearted Slav brothers and sisters. Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox church displayed similar tendencies during their visits to the Soviet Union, where they showed a great deal of mistrust towards Soviet State personnel and institutions but tried to get in touch with ordinary Russians.



The paper is based on research in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Central State Archive of Saint Petersburg (CGA) and in the Soviet press of the 1960s.

*Janine-Marie Calic*

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

### **TITO, THE POLICY OF ACTIVE COEXISTENCE AND THE GERMAN QUESTION (1968-1975)**

This paper explores various dimensions of the Yugoslav doctrine and policy of “active peaceful coexistence” taking her approach towards the German question during the détente process as an example. After the Soviet-Yugoslav break-up Tito had to redefine both Yugoslavia’s political system and her foreign policy orientation. Gradual opening towards the West and subsequent normalization of relations with the Soviet Union granted Yugoslavia the privileged position of a broker between the confronted blocs. In contrast to Yugoslavia’s activities in the nascent non-aligned movement, there is comparatively little research on her international policy in the post-1968 period. Yet, in order to safeguard the non-aligned country’s independence, diplomacy in general, and Tito himself in particular, remained proactive agents of moderation and mediation in Cold War conflicts on a global level even in this later period of time. Against this background, this provides insights into how Tito and his diplomats contributed to the rapprochement between West Germany and the GDR which Tito considered as key to overcoming the dynamics of bipolarity. It will be demonstrated how Yugoslavia’s actions, strategies, rhetoric, and institutional settings blurred the confrontational logic of the Cold War. By providing information, lines of communication and mediation services, but also by agenda-setting in international relations and on UN level, not least by Tito’s personal ‘summit diplomacy’, Yugoslavia played a constructive role in trust-building between East and West Germany culminating in the CSCE process.

*Petar Dragišić*

Institute of Contemporary History of Serbia

## **WALKING A TIGHTROPE: TITO'S REGIONAL AMBITIONS AND THE COMINFORM RESOLUTION**

In the aftermath of the Second World War Tito's National Liberation Army emerged as the most powerful military force in the Southeast European region. Consequently, the newly established communist regime in Yugoslavia endeavored to capitalize on its strength, the weakness of the Yugoslav neighbors as well as on the favorable geopolitical conditions. In the first post-war years Tito's regime focused its efforts on expanding the territory of Yugoslavia and extending its influence in the neighboring countries (the Trieste crisis, the project of South Slavic federation, the support for the communist "Democratic Army of Greece", the territorial claims against Austria, etc.). Nevertheless, the conflict with Moscow in 1948 represented a serious blow to the Yugoslav power putting Tito on the defensive. Consequently, Tito gave up his ambitious projects in the Balkans and focused on protecting Yugoslav borders. Given the presence of both global Cold War coalitions on its borders Yugoslavia was constrained to play a demanding simultaneous game in the Balkan minefield. The paper focuses on the relations of Tito's Yugoslavia with its neighbors and the regional strategies of Tito's regime from the final stage of the Second World War and the subsequent establishing of the communist regime in Belgrade to the initial phase of the Tito-Stalin split in 1948/1949. The research will test the hypothesis that the Yugoslav relations with its neighbors were shaped by a blend of global (Cold War bipolarity) and regional (minority issues, pre-war territorial disputes...) factors. The research will focus on principal objectives of Tito's policy towards the Yugoslav neighbors in the first post-war years. In this regard the paper will pay particular attention to the impact of the Tito-Stalin split on the Yugoslav neighborhood policy in 1948/1949. The research is based on an analysis of archive sources (from the Archive of Yugoslavia and the Diplomatic Archive of Serbia), contemporary press articles, published documents and secondary sources.

*Andrey Edemskiy*

Slavic Studies Institute/Russian Academy of Sciences

**SOVIET INFORMATION POLICY DURING THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV CONFLICT AND NORMALIZATION: BETWEEN PROPAGANDA AND OBJECTIVE BRIEFING (1948-1958)**

The text for presentation will be written relying on newly declassified and recently published documents from Russian (Soviet) central archives (MFA and RGANI/Central Committee CPSU) as well on yet totally unknown to public and researchers new documents from other Soviet/Russian archives in Moscow. One of the main presumptions of the author of possible text of report to Conference is understanding that despite of all points of the Information Bureau's two resolutions on the „Yugoslav matter“ (1948-1949) which initiated and widened the break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union turning it into one of the fiercest conflicts of early Cold War period as remnants of this approach were staying in life even after Belgrade and Moscow declarations 1955-1956, Soviet information policy had different faces. It assisted not only to propaganda against Yugoslav leaders but also trying to forward more wider information to upper Soviet bureaucrats for their decision-making. These contradictory and complex processes will be subject for analysis. The presentation will deal with several periods with following subtopics: Soviet information and propaganda policy (not only Cominform and Yugoslav anti-Tito émigré) but Soviet state information agencies in 1948- early 1953; reduction of hostile propaganda from March 1953; looking for new approach since Djilas Affair January 1953; end of hostile propaganda (Fall 1954) and the role of TASS information agency for Soviet leaders before first ad hoc meeting with high Yugoslav representatives (Todorović-Vidić) in Moscow late December 1954; the activation of Soviet interest towards Yugoslav domestic life (1955-1956); controversial on perceptions of Tito's visit to the Soviet Union in June 1956; Soviet reaction on Tito's speech in Pula and Kardelj report in Parliament (November-December 1956); a glimmer of hope of more liberal Soviet approach towards Yugoslavia during 1957 with more attention to her domestic problems (including interethnic as Kosovo etc) 1957-early 1958. In the analysis more materials of Soviet inner reports of Soviet media persons in Yugoslavia to

upper Soviet officials will be also analyzed. The presentations will be finished before events in Spring 1958, therefore not cover the Soviet information and propaganda activities related to Soviet critique of Yugoslav Communist party draft program (March 1958) as it is very specific and interesting another topic.

*Aleš Gabrič*

Institute of Contemporary History, Ljubljana

### **COMINFORM SUPPORTERS IN SLOVENIA**

The following contribution describes the persecution of actual and imaginary supporters of the Cominform Resolution in Slovenia. In the scientific literature, Slovenia has already been depicted as the part of Yugoslavia where, unlike in certain other parts of Yugoslavia, people agreeing with the Cominform Resolution were relatively few and far between. Furthermore, Cominform Supporters in Slovenia were merely individuals or smaller groups, and therefore they did not represent any larger organised groups or political factors that could seriously challenge the authority of the ruling elite. Nevertheless, the authorities designated many critics of the regime from their own ranks as “Cominform Supporters”, and these were most frequently from the ranks of the intellectuals. The contribution describes the difference between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia with regard to the persecution of the alleged Stalin’s sympathisers; points out the difference in the percentage of the people arrested and their social structure; as well as defines the period when the arrests were most frequent. Special attention is paid to certain cases that deviated significantly from the average. The example of the group gathered around Dragotin Gustinčič is outlined, as this conflict reveals the unsolved disputes between the authorities and the older generation of communists, who felt left out and neglected after Tito had taken over the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It is precisely the case of Gustinčič that indicates how a long-term conflict between an individual and the authorities could lead to people who were already imprisoned at that time and had nothing whatsoever to do with the Cominform Resolution being subse-

quently designated as Cominform supporters as well. Dragotin Gustinčič's letters, addressed to the leading Slovenian communists in the first years after the war, can be deemed as the most severe critique of the communist regime, written from the extremely leftist viewpoints of the communist intellectuals. The analysis of these letters reveals certain similarities with the criticism that would be voiced by the Cominform Resolution only months later.

### *Ivo Goldstein*

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb

#### **THE TITO-STALIN SPLIT 1948 AS A PERSONAL CONFLICT**

The conflict of 1948 was quite complex and stratified – it was ideological, political, with obvious economical roots and consequences. It was at the same time personal, because it was the conflict of two charismatic personalities – Tito and Stalin. The Yugoslav communist movement enjoyed greater independence than others in Eastern Europe because it had largely fought its own way into power. Tito came to Yugoslavia in 1938 as a Soviet communist agent, but his war victories helped him outgrow that early role and he developed into an extremely self-confident leader who would not allow the USSR and Stalin to dictate to him. His ambitions also grew. He tried to achieve domination over Albania, he planned to make himself head of a Balkan federation that would include Bulgaria, and complained to the Soviet authorities when they imposed unequal economic relations bordering on exploitation on Yugoslavia. All this made Stalin and the other Soviet leaders regard him with suspicion, and they began to exert various kinds of pressure on the Yugoslav leadership. The author investigates various aspects of this conflict. Josip Broz Tito won that battle, becoming the only international leader who gained victory over Hitler and Stalin.

*Maximilian Graf*

European University Institute – History and Civilization, Florence

**UPSIDE-DOWN: BILATERAL AND TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND YUGOSLAVIA BEFORE AND AFTER 1948**

Postwar relations between Austria and Yugoslavia had been extremely tense and the incipient Cold War made the situation even worse. Among the reasons were the repercussions of World War II, the territorial conflict, the treatment of minorities, and the deepening East-West divide. This deadlock was rapidly overcome after the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 and the subsequent reorientation of Belgrade's policy towards the West. Fostered by Western support, bilateral relations started to reconcile and already in the early 1950s turned into an early example of *détente* between an – even though occupied – evolving Western style democracy and a – despite the split – Socialist regime. The situation at the border normalized, economic cooperation grew, and political relations improved. When Austrian foreign minister Karl Gruber visited Yugoslavia in 1952, the former conflictive issues played hardly any role and both sides started to work towards a good neighborly relationship. Tito was a driving force in this development and even exchanged his estimates of Soviet policy with Austrian diplomats at length. Naturally, it took time to solve all the problems and some of them continued to cyclically burden relations, but the very years after 1948 had laid the basis for an exceptional (in ideological terms) East-West relationship of the Cold War era in which neutral Austria and non-aligned Yugoslavia positioned themselves between the blocs. On the contrary, relations between the Austrian and the Yugoslav Communists, which had been excellent after 1945, collapsed against the backdrop of the Tito-Stalin split. The Austrian party followed Moscow's line, condemned Tito as a "traitor" (even though this caused severe internal conflicts) and furthermore deplored any rapprochement between Belgrade and Vienna. Hence, Tito held a very low opinion of his Austrian "comrades" and the reestablishment of party relations materialized only slowly after Khrushchev changed the Kremlin's stance in the mid-1950s.

*Tvrtko Jakovina*

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb

**AGAINST THE BETRAYAL OF TITO'S GANG: TOUR OF THE  
HAJDUK SOCCER TEAM IN AUSTRALIA AND THEIR FIGHT  
AGAINST COMINFORM SUPPORTERS IN 1949**

The football club Hajduk from Split embarked on its longest and furthest foreign tour in the beginning of July 1949. The men of Hajduk went to Australia and New Zealand, where they were supposed to demonstrate the force of Yugoslav football and physical culture, although the real reasons were different. Members of the Australian Croatian community had come to Australia before the Second World War and were divided into “royalists”, “Catholics”, or simply “anticommunists”. A special problem was posed by those who were agitating “against the betrayal of Tito’s clique”. The paper will describe the tour of one of Croatia’s and Yugoslavia’s most famous football clubs, emphasizing the penetration of Cominform ideas within the Australian and New Zealand Croatian community, as well as Yugoslav attempts at opposing these ideas.

*Darja Kerec*

Faculty of Education, University of Ljubljana

**THE ROLE OF RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN  
THE HISTORY OF PREKMURJE**

Despite the end of World War I, Prekmurje remained a part of Hungary until mid-August 1919. The border between the Republic of Hungary and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians was finally demarcated at the Grand Trianon on 4 June 1920. The inhabitants of Prekmurje, Slovenians and Hungarians alike, had already become accustomed to uncertain political circumstances during the four years of war. They had been informed of the events of the February (Bourgeois) and October Revolution of 1917, and awaited the outcome of the war in fear. Prekmurje was the only part of Slovenian territory, at the time still a part of Hungary, to be affected by the

revolution. In the media in the interwar period (1918/19 to 1941), representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and the local authorities would often express their fear of Bolshevism, social democracy, Marxism and the influence of the Soviet Union, which, however, was only marginal at the time. All of that changed during World War II; as early as 3 April 1945, Russian soldiers (the Red Army, made up of the left wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front) marched into Prekmurje (Murska Sobota) and liberated it. As the grand victor, the Soviet Union immortalised its military and administrative presence by building and solemnly unveiling a victory monument in the centre of Murska Sobota on 12 August 1945. This monument that glorifies a Red Army soldier and a partisan would most likely not have been erected in 1948 (conflict with the Cominform); however, the government did adopt the Act on the Protection of Cultural Monuments and Natural Features in that very year. This 17 metres tall monument was designed by the Russian architect Jurij Arončik, while the two bronze sculptures are the work of the Kalin brothers (the partisan was sculpted by Zdenko, and the Red Army soldier by Boris Kalin). A Russian T 34 tank is also a part of the monument. This was followed by a decade of post-war reconstruction and accelerated industrialisation, and the Russian influences subsided for a while, as they did elsewhere throughout the then Yugoslavia ... A demonstrative act in the conflict between Tito and Stalin was the removal of Stalin's image from the top of this monument. In the mid-Fifties, events in Hungary once again put the attitude of Slovenians (Yugoslavians) towards the Soviet Union to the test; especially in Prekmurje and along the border with Hungary, which was sealed tight. At the end of 1956, Hungarian refugees retreated to the Yugoslavian side (according to available data, close to 2,300 of them sought shelter in Slovenia). Later on, the Yugoslavian authorities attempted to resolve their status with a special asylum policy. Until the end of the Cold War, the democratisation of Hungary, and Slovenia's attainment of independence, the border between Yugoslavia and Hungary was strictly guarded on the Prekmurje side; many still remember that an ordinary crossing of the border was quite an adventure for Yugoslavian tourists and consumers, because they were awaited on the Hungarian side not only by Hungarian customs officers, but by Soviet soldiers as well.



*John P. Kraljic*

Croatian Academy of America

## **YUGOSLAV-AMERICAN COMMUNITIES AND THE TITO-STALIN BREAK**

World War II had been a watershed in the development of Yugoslav communities in North America. Croatian-Americans and Croatian-Canadians, by far the largest of the three major communities, lived with the shadow of the Independent State of Croatia, which had declared war against, among others, the United States. However, their community's leadership, strongly influenced, alternatively, by Leftist, Communist or Liberal, pro-New Deal ideas, for the most part declared themselves in favor of the Partisans. The leadership of the Serbian community in North America generally favored the restoration of King Peter II and the Chetnik movement. Nevertheless, Serbs in the United States and Canada also had very strong and vocal pro-Communist organizations. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which had relied on financial contributions of immigrants in the pre-War years, placed great store on the sympathy of Yugoslav immigrants and followed these developments with sustained interest. The end of the War resulted in these pro-Partisan groups having a preponderant voice in their respective ethnic communities. The Tito-Stalin break in 1948 shattered this outward display of unity. This paper will examine the after effects of the break on the two largest Yugoslav-American communities. Most ethnic Croat and Serb Communists in North America sided with Stalin, ultimately leading to the deterioration of their recently won leadership roles in the communities at large. That some Communists supported Tito gave birth to a vitriolic, decades' long campaign between the two competing pro-Communist camps. These disputes caused large internal fractures to arise in and between many organizations, chasms which increased as a result of the growing anti-Communist hysteria in the United States and the influx of large numbers of mainly nationalist, anti-Communist refugees to Canada and the United States from Yugoslavia. These events had profound and damaging effects on the communities and their organizations which continued into the late 1980s.

**Mark Kramer**

Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

### **STALIN AND THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV SPLIT**

My paper will draw on published and declassified archival sources from former Communist countries and from the West to offer a reassessment of the Soviet-Yugoslav split, focusing in particular on Stalin's efforts to bring Yugoslavia back under Soviet domination. My paper will review the main reasons for the schism between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and then examine how Stalin attempted to bring Tito to heel. For more than two years the Soviet Union tried to regain control over Yugoslavia through non-military means, but Stalin in the final two years of his life also steadily prepared for a military solution. My paper will trace the evolution of Stalin's policy from 1948 to 1953, showing not only the various tactics he used in dealing with Yugoslavia but also how he sought to forestall any wider adverse repercussions in the Soviet bloc.

**Martin Previšić**

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb

### **THE 1948 SPLIT AND THE NEW ROUND OF FACTIONAL BATTLES WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA: PARALLEL BIOGRAPHIES AND HISTORIES**

The Tito-Stalin split initiated a sequence of factional struggles in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which had been a frequent occurrence almost since the days of its founding. For most of the Party membership, the existence of the conflict, as well as its sources, were kept secret, so many Yugoslav communists were left to seek out the reasons for the conflict on their own, and who thereby often imagined their own interpretations as they were at a loss for plausible explanations. The CPY, pressed from without by ideological, military, economic and diplomatic pressures, as well as its own Stalinist substance from within, would drastically cut down any of the opposing and dissenting viewpoints. Through the presentation of several

parallel biographies, such as the one of the old Yugoslav communist Vicko Jelaska, this paper will show how the split with Stalin opened up a continuation of the factional struggles which had been present since Tito's rise to power in the Party. The losers in these earlier struggles would see the split as a new chance for regaining power in the Party with Stalin's help. The CPY leadership focused their attention on these individuals before the onset of mass repression. The other "radical" faction of communists who had escaped or stayed in the USSR and other Bloc countries after 1948 will be examined in this paper. These examples and approach will help further define the complex typologies of the split within the CPY after 1948.

*Božo Repe*

Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

## **HOW SLOVENIA BECAME THE WESTERNMOST PART OF THE EASTERN WORLD AT THE TIME OF THE COMINFORM**

Slovenia, the westernmost Yugoslav republic, differed from the other republics as regards the conflict with the Cominform. Very few people openly supported the Cominform, which is why we cannot speak of an organised Cominform opposition. In Slovenia, there was no danger of a "fifth column" in the event of a Soviet attack, in contrast to the traditionally Russophile regions of Yugoslavia. However, the lists of the State Security Administration (UDBA) contained many people who criticised the authorities for various reasons. Because the term Cominformist became a synonym for an internal enemy of the state, such critics of authorities were proclaimed "Cominformists". Most of them were imprisoned without trial; they were subjected to physical and psychological torture, just as the "real" Cominformists were. A total of 731 people were arrested (members and non-members of all classes); 334 of them received an administrative penalty (a penalty of up to two years, with the possibility of being reimposed, was imposed by the State Security Administration); while 157 of them were sentenced in court. Some of them never returned from serving their sentence. It was estimated that there was a total of around 1,000 Cominformists in Slovenia, which was a

much smaller number than in other parts of Yugoslavia. The authorities mostly searched for Cominformists among the intellectuals, because they were the most critical of government mistakes. In the mid-fifties, Cominform-related sentences ceased (with a few exceptions), but they still kept a close eye on former prisoners. At the beginning of the Fifties, the conflict with the Cominform was followed by a search for an alternative route to socialism. Repression gradually subsided. Collectivisation was abandoned. In the context of Slovenia, the new economic system introduced at the beginning of the Fifties denoted above all the freeing up of domestic trade and the modernisation of banking on more modern foundations (among other things, the introduction of the so-called communal banks that began conducting transactions with citizens, giving out housing loans, and providing other services to a limited extent). In October 1951, the guaranteed supply system was abolished, coupons were replaced with money, and in the months to come, market prices were introduced for rationed goods. The supply of the population started to depend on the operation of commercial companies and on buyers' earnings. In 1952, the agitprop apparatus was abolished (it was revived in 1956 in milder form as an ideological commission at the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia). Ideological control lessened, which resulted in the creation of a number of ideologically unburdened works in diverse areas of culture. Opening up the border with Italy and Austria enabled a comparison with capitalism, and Slovenian authorities were forced – more than the authorities in other parts of Yugoslavia – to try to match the personal and social standard to that of the two neighbouring countries. Slovenian industry likewise – though slowly and awkwardly – kept up with the demands of buyers and in the mid-Fifties began making refrigerators, washing machines and other household appliances, and developing a more attractive textile industry, as well as others. Western influences in the post-Cominform period must be viewed in a wider context, together with Western films and music that started coming to these parts in the early Fifties, with the development of television in the late Fifties, and with the increase in motorisation and foreign tourists. The effects of this early liberalisation process were reflected in a gradual raising of the standard and in a faster path towards consumerism.

*Peter Ruggenthaler*

University of Graz

### **THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY IN STALIN'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-53**

The paper will show how Stalin used the Carinthian question to blame Tito. The Soviets also used Yugoslav behaviour toward Austria to find further arguments to exclude the Yugoslavs from their Bloc. Furthermore, we now know from the Politburo files, that Stalin was not ready to give up the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Eastern Austria also because of Tito.

*Karlo Ružičić-Kessler*

Free University of Bozen-Bolzano

### **THE TITO-STALIN SPLIT AND ITS EFFECTS ON COMMUNIST PARTY RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY**

Considering the shifts and rifts inside the common communist camp during the Cold War, one always finds the question of the Tito-Stalin split of June 1948 as a landmark event for emancipation and the search for new paths to socialism, not dictated by one „monolith“. This proposal focuses on interparty relations and dialogue before, during and after the split in the perspective of one major international and transnational question: the fate of Trieste. Both the Italian and the Yugoslav CP were at the center of discussion on the future of Trieste after World War II. While Yugoslavia implemented communist rule, the Italian communists were torn between the struggle within the frame of a “Western bourgeois” democracy and the internationalist movement. The Yugoslav comrades held the upper hand for most of the time due to the support of the Soviet Union, yet the Italian communists did not give up on their “national” agenda, creating a special blend of interests in the small contested strip of land between Italy and Yugoslavia. After the Tito-Stalin split, the question was reversed. Now the Italian communists were at the forefront of the struggle against Tito and financed actions to destabilize the regime. Adding to this complex situation

the autonomous communist party installed in Trieste – first dominated by Belgrade and after 1948 by Rome – took a surprisingly independent stance on some transnational questions before and after June 1948 – being a propaganda tool for Belgrade at first and of the Cominform thereafter. Therefore, the analysis of these interparty relations can tell us more about the question of early “emancipation” in the communist world and how it developed in the corset of a “monolithic” movement, while also revealing the repercussions of 1948 in a wider transnational party network.

***Boris Stamenić***

Freelance researcher and lecturer in the field of contemporary history and historical-political education

**HUMOUR, MOCKERY AND VISUAL REPRESENTATION IN  
THE CONTEXT OF THE TITO-STALIN SPLIT**

Since its revelation in summer 1948, the political dispute between Moscow and Belgrade had been accompanied by escalating propaganda war between the conflict parties. Beyond the justifying of own position in the conflict, the commonly crucial aspect of propagandistic efforts was to delegitimise the antagonist. However, in contrast to the already flaming propaganda war between two major ideological blocks across the European continent and beyond, the Tito-Stalin split was strongly marked through the competition of two communist regimes, both struggling to demonstrate their own ideological purity. Correspondingly, a crucial point in this competition was not only to demonstrate own righteousness but also to stage an aberration of the antagonistic party from ideas, values and goals of communist ideology. Nevertheless, the propagandistic assignment frequently resulted in the utilisation of sneaky traducement and reproduction of nationalistic stereotypes for the purpose of deligitimisation of the others in which the issue of ideological aberration had rather minor significance. The presentation broaches the issue of visual representation of the other conflict side in the socialist states of Eastern Europe during the so called Cominform-period 1948-1956. The central points of interest are the strategies of

delegitimation of Soviet Union and its satellites in Yugoslavia and vice versa. A special attention is going to be put on the propagandistic utilisation of humour and mockery in comics and cartoons. Through the implementation of methods of critical discourse analysis of the selected visual sources, the presentation will focus the transmitted political messages in the images. The visual messages are going to be juxtaposed with contemporary media articles and other publications from the Cominform period.

*David Tompkins*

Carleton College, USA

**IMAGINING YUGOSLAVIA IN WARSAW AND EAST BERLIN IN  
THE EARLY COLD WAR: THE TITO-STALIN SPLIT AND ITS  
EFFECTS ON POLISH AND EAST GERMAN SOCIETY**

The Tito-Stalin split came as a shock to East German and Polish communists and their fellow citizens. After being celebrated as a friend in the immediate postwar years, in 1948 Yugoslavia was excommunicated from the socialist community at the very moment of its consolidation, and the country thus carried great symbolic weight for Central Europeans. The sudden emergence of Yugoslavia as a Feindbild, or image of an enemy, had significant effects on the worldviews of Poles and East Germans in the early Cold War. This paper will examine the period 1948 to 1955, and will focus on the attempts by the SED and PZPR to transform the image of Yugoslavia for pedagogical purposes. In the early Cold War, representations of friends and enemies played a key role in the worldview constructed by Central European communists. Party members and sympathizers used these images, based in reality but interpreted to serve ideological goals, to help define and develop their ideal vision of society and to claim legitimacy for their political program. They carefully formulated these profiles of the “other” and encouraged citizens to emulate or reject them accordingly. Such images saturated everyday life through the press and other popular media, and proved crucial to the parties’ attempts to mobilize and influence their populations. For citizens, these omnipresent representations formed part of the imagined world

of the new socialist reality and shaped their lived experience of communism in Central Europe. The confusion around the revised representation of Yugoslavia produced a significant dissonance among party members and the population—while a consistent worldview that implied the success of communism was undermined, these ideological fissures provided opportunities to explore alternate ideas and to question the correctness of party doctrine. The interaction with and representation of Yugoslavia was thus an important site for contesting what communism would actually look like in East Germany and Poland. Tito's Yugoslavia became a cautionary example of arrogance, hypernationalism, the betrayal of correct communist ideals, the corruption of capitalism, and the seduction of the West, and proved a useful pedagogical example against which the "proper" socialist society could be defined during this initial peak of the Cold War. But the highly positive image propagated during the immediate postwar years did not just disappear, and indeed was mobilized by those who wished for an alternative to the Stalinist system. For party leaders who desired to construct their vision, for reformers who wanted to modify that vision, and for ordinary citizens who sought to have their voices heard, Yugoslavia was a crucial touchstone in the early Cold War.

*Ondřej Vojtěchovský*

Charles University, Prague

**IDENTITY IN THE MAKING: NARRATIVES ON THE TITOIST PERSECUTIONS IN THE CIRCLES OF YUGOSLAV COMINFORMIST EXILE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

The paper will focus on images and narratives that concern the Titoist persecutions, as presented by the Yugoslav Cominformist exiles in Soviet bloc countries, especially in Czechoslovakia. It will substantiate the claim that the accounts on prosecution of "the honest communists by the Tito's clique" became a cornerstone of the Cominformist exile's identity. After the Cominform's resolution from June 1948, the Yugoslav communists who resided abroad had to choose within few days whether they will support the



Soviet accusations against Tito or remain faithful to their Party leadership. The reasons for “signing Resolution” were determined by various factors: the persuasiveness of the communist officials in the country of their residence, the logic of subordination and obedience to Stalin as a supreme leader of the international proletariat, the Russophile sentiments, purely individual interests etc. Nevertheless, many émigrés emphasised retrospectively that the crucial point for their choice was the death of a wartime hero, General Arso Jovanović, shot by the Yugoslav border guard on the frontier with Rumania. Later on, also other reports and rumours on the violence against “honest communists”, former partisan fighters and party veterans, helped to confirm their fatal decision. The lack of convincing ideology-based arguments made the alleged Titoist violence to appear as the main proof of the Yugoslav leadership’s treason. Paradoxically, the stories about the Yugoslav state security service’s cruel treatment with the pro-Soviet individuals were made public at the time of unleashed terror and unprecedented power of political police in Czechoslovakia and the other Soviet bloc countries themselves. Curiously enough, the Yugoslav Cominformist émigrés have only very limited access to the relevant evidence concerning the real extent and the very nature of Titoist repressive interventions during the Soviet-Yugoslav split. It was only in the second half of the 1950s as some former Goli otok prisoners informed in detail about the practices in this concentration camp and other detention facilities. Hence, the Goli otok testimonies motivated Cominformists in the following decades to retain their strong anti-Titoist feelings and to make up their common political identity.

*Péter Vukman*

University of Szeged

### **THE HISTORY OF YUGOSLAV COMINFORMIST EMIGRANTS IN HUNGARY (1948–1953)**

As a consequence of the outbreak of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict in 1948, Yugoslav emigrants, so-called Cominformist or *ibeovci*, communities were established in the Soviet Union and in its Eastern European satellite

states from those political emigrants who supported the policy of Joseph Stalin against Josip Broz Tito and the Yugoslav leadership. Their collective was organized in Hungary, too, at the turn of 1948–1949. The emigrants' community served as a useful instrument in the everyday propaganda warfare against Yugoslavia. However, their political activities became an impediment of the slow, gradual and time-consuming process of normalization between Hungary and Yugoslavia after 1953 and their official political organizations were dissolved in 1954. In my paper, I am going to summarize the history of ibeovci emigrants in Hungary between the years 1948–1953. First, I will investigate their political activities, including their participation in propaganda warfare against Yugoslavia (radio broadcasts, weekly papers, and the Slovenian-language emigrant paper *Za ljudsko zmago*). Then I will analyse their special and often ambivalent relationship with the Hungarian State Protection Authority (ÁVH). I will put particular emphasis on two show trials here. One was carried out against Lazar Brankov, first leader of the ibeovci emigrants in Hungary and tertiary defendant of Rajk trial, the exemplar of Eastern European show trials and in which Brankov provided the charges against Josip Broz Tito and the Yugoslav leadership. The other trial took place three years later, in 1952, and it involved six ibeovci emigrants. Finally, in the third part of my paper, I will outline the social composition of the emigrants, their everyday problems, and material and language difficulties. Here, I will also make some brief comparison with Greek and Spanish political emigrants in Hungary.

